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INTRODUCTION 
Government-mandated disclosures and warnings aimed at promoting 
public health are ubiquitous. Alcoholic beverage labels bear government 
warnings against alcohol consumption during pregnancy.1 Both prescription 
and over-the-counter drugs must comply with extensive Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) labeling requirements.2 Automobiles carry mandatory 
safety rating labels.3 Cigarette packages have included warnings about the 
dangers of smoking since 1965.4 Even chain restaurants must now follow the 
federal nutrition labeling requirements that have applied to food packaging 
for two decades. 5  Warnings and disclosure requirements are likely to 
become even more widespread given President Obama’s 2011 executive 
 
† Online Managing Editor, Volume 162, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D., 2014, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Brown University. Thank you to Professor Eric 
Feldman for his guidance on writing this Note, and to the editors of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, particularly Jake Hartman and Margaret Zhang, for their work improving this piece. 
All remaining errors are my own. 
1 See generally 27 U.S.C. §§ 213–219a (2012) (setting forth alcoholic beverage labeling requirements). 
2 See generally 21 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2014) (outlining labeling requirements for prescription and 
over-the-counter drugs). 
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012) (“Every manufacturer of new automobiles . . . shall . . . securely 
affix . . . one or more safety ratings . . . .”); 49 C.F.R. §§ 575.301–302 (2013) (providing detailed 
labeling guidance). 
4 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 
282, 283 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012)) (requiring cigarette packages to include 
the statement “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health”). 
5 See infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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order encouraging administrative agencies to use these “[f] lexible 
[a]pproaches” wherever “relevant, feasible, . . . consistent with regulatory 
objectives, and . . . permitted by law.”6  
Despite their widespread use as a regulatory tool, government-mandated 
warnings and disclosures are not immune from legal challenge. In the 2012 
case of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit invalidated FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings on First 
Amendment grounds.7 The tobacco manufacturers’ challenge forced the 
D.C. Circuit to wade into unchartered waters. Although there is a long line 
of Supreme Court cases addressing First Amendment challenges to com-
mercial speech restrictions (e.g., advertising bans), the Court has heard only 
two challenges to commercial speech disclosure requirements, neither 
involving government-mandated warnings.8 Further, while the Court has 
been clear that it reviews commercial speech restrictions under the Central 
Hudson intermediate scrutiny test,9 it has applied a standard akin to rational 
basis review when examining purely factual disclosure requirements targeting 
consumer deception, without explaining in what other circumstances 
rational basis review would apply.10 Thus, faced with a novel question of 
law, the R.J. Reynolds court concluded that the graphic cigarette warning 
requirements did not merit rational basis review protection, because (1) they did 
not seek to cure consumer deception and (2) they were not purely factual 
and uncontroversial warnings, but rather “admonitions: ‘[D]on’t buy or use 
this product.’”11 After deciding that Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny 
 
6 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 ( Jan. 21, 2011). 
7 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 
18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
8 See generally infra Part I (discussing the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in 
the commercial speech context, and citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), and Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), 
as the sole Supreme Court cases addressing First Amendment challenges to commercial speech 
disclosure requirements). 
9 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (“If the communication is neither misleading nor related to 
unlawful activity, . . . [t]he State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on 
commercial speech . . . , the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest[, and t]he 
limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal.”). 
10 See, e.g., infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
11 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211-17. While disclosures and warnings are two different types of 
government-mandated commercial speech, R.J. Reynolds did not indicate that warnings and 
disclosures inherently deserve different levels of judicial scrutiny. This Note takes the position 
that warnings and disclosures should not be treated differently: both may fulfill the First 
Amendment’s goal of promoting the dissemination of information without burdening individual 
liberty. Although there is a greater potential for a warning to cross the line into promoting an 
ideological message (thus burdening the commercial speaker’s First Amendment rights), the type 
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was the correct standard of review, the court held the warnings unconstitu-
tional because FDA failed to produce sufficient evidence—indeed, “failed to 
present any data”—that the warnings would directly and materially advance 
its goal of reducing smoking rates.12 Although most commentators expected 
the case to go to the Supreme Court,13 FDA instead withdrew the proposed 
images and said it would issue revised graphic warnings.14  
To the extent that R.J. Reynolds could be read as holding that only com-
mercial speech mandates that are both purely factual and designed to 
correct consumer deception receive rational basis review, it was overruled 
by the 2014 en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit, American Meat Institute v. 
USDA.15 Aligning the court’s position with that of other circuits, the D.C. 
Circuit held in American Meat Institute that Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel,16 the first Supreme Court case to apply rational basis review to a 
government-mandated disclosure requirement, extended “beyond problems 
of deception”—and thus applied to the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) country-of-origin disclosures at issue in the case.17 
Given that the D.C. Circuit is responsible for reviewing many federal 
agency regulations, American Meat Institute marks a significant victory for 
regulators. A contrary holding—one limiting the protection of Zauderer 
rational basis review to compelled speech aimed at curing deception—would 
have threatened to unsettle the current regulatory regime, and would have 
 
of warning at issue (e.g., one that simply provides information about potential harms, as compared 
to one that goes further by admonishing consumers against buying a product) should be consid-
ered when determining whether the warning is purely factual and thus deserves rational basis 
review.  
12 Id. at 1217, 1220-22. 
13 See, e.g., Richard Craver, Successful Appeal of Graphic Cigarette Labels Likely Headed for U.S. 
Supreme Court, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Dec. 5, 2012, 5:52 PM), http://www.journalnow.com/news/
local/article_751e2000-3f2e-11e2-b08c-001a4bcf6878.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VX28-X5SH 
(noting that the case appeared “destined” for Supreme Court review). Tobacco manufacturers’ 
facial challenge to the Tobacco Control Act’s graphic warning requirement failed in the Sixth 
Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied the manufacturers’ petition for a grant of certiorari. See 
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he 
Act’s warnings are reasonably related to the government’s interest in preventing consumer 
deception and are therefore constitutional.”), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). 
14 See Michael Felberbaum, U.S. to Revise Cigarette Warning Labels, NBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 
2013, 2:27 PM), http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/19/17375279-us-to-revise-cigarette-warning-
labels, archived at http://perma.cc/ER7A-5U3Z (noting how FDA planned to “undertake research 
to support a new rulemaking consistent with the Tobacco Control Act” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
15 760 F.3d 18, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
16 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
17 Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 20. 
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particularly threatened mandates aimed at promoting public health. These 
disclosure requirements often do not target potentially deceptive commer-
cial speech, and they rarely are supported by the level of evidence R.J. 
Reynolds deemed necessary to satisfy Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.18 
(These evidentiary difficulties arise in part because many public health 
problems are complex and cannot be eradicated by a disclosure requirement 
alone.) While R.J. Reynolds raised important questions about the effectiveness 
of disclosure requirements, the First Amendment should not be an 
insurmountable obstacle when the commercial speaker’s constitutionally 
protected interest is, as the Court has said, “minimal”19 and the government 
interest is substantial.20 
Although American Meat Institute lessened the blow R.J. Reynolds 
dealt to regulators, both decisions left open important questions about 
the First Amendment treatment of government-mandated warnings that 
are neither “purely factual and uncontroversial”21 disclosures nor overt 
government-sanctioned opinions, and about whether graphic cigarette 
warnings belong in this middle ground. R.J. Reynolds only addressed the 
constitutionality of the nine warnings before it,22 and left unanswered 
whether another graphic warning depicting the negative health consequences 
of smoking could be constitutional. But, in characterizing FDA’s graphic 
warnings as “a much different animal” than the mandated statements to 
which the Supreme Court has previously applied rational basis review,23 
and in viewing them as “intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at 
most, shock the viewer into retaining the information in the text warning,”24 
R.J. Reynolds strongly implied that no graphic cigarette warning could ever 
receive rational basis review protection. Not only did the court seem to 
demand Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny review for all government-
mandated graphic warnings, it created an overly burdensome intermediate 
scrutiny test by misapplying the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) 
 
18 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (chastising 
FDA for failing to produce “substantial evidence” supporting the effectiveness of its graphic 
cigarette warnings), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(en banc). 
19 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (noting that a commercial speaker’s “constitutionally protected 
interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal”). 
20 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (recognizing the government’s 
substantial interest in “promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens”).  
21 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
22 See id. at 1209 (discussing FDA’s nine selected images). 
23 Id. at 1216. 
24 Id. 
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“substantial evidence” standard to its First Amendment analysis, and by 
failing to look beyond the Court’s abstract statements about Central Hudson 
to its application of the test.25 
Part I of this Note outlines the Supreme Court’s commercial speech 
jurisprudence. It explains the Court’s differential treatment of commercial 
speech restrictions and compelled commercial speech, and it outlines the 
open question of whether Zauderer, and its accompanying rational basis 
review protection, is limited to mandates aimed at correcting deception. 
Part II discusses the various interpretations of Zauderer advanced by circuit 
courts. It defends the broader interpretation of Zauderer adopted by the 
First Circuit, Second Circuit, and, most recently, the D.C. Circuit in 
American Meat Institute, and it criticizes the narrow interpretation articulated 
in R.J. Reynolds. Part II likewise outlines the doctrinal support and policy 
justifications for a broader interpretation of Zauderer, with particular focus 
on the importance of recognizing the government’s interest in promoting 
public health as worthy of rational basis review. Part III then looks at how 
FDA could issue revised graphic cigarette warnings that would pass consti-
tutional muster. It examines the type of graphic cigarette warnings that 
could potentially merit review under the Zauderer standard, argues that R.J. 
Reynolds misapplied the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny standard, 
suggests a better view of Central Hudson as applied to graphic cigarette 
warnings, and describes post-Reynolds scientific research supporting the 
effectiveness of graphic warnings. 
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Commercial speech received little First Amendment protection until 
1976, when the Supreme Court first recognized pharmacists’ constitutional 
right to advertise prescription drug prices in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.26 The Court declared that an 
advertiser’s purely economic motive does not disqualify the advertiser from 
First Amendment protection,27 and the Court emphasized the informative 
value of commercial speech: a “consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his 
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate”;28 “society also may have 
a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information”;29 and “the 
 
25 See infra subsection III.C.2. 
26 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 763. 
29 Id. at 764. 
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free flow of commercial information is indispensable” to making intelligent 
and well-informed economic decisions.30 The First Amendment, the Court 
held, did not permit the state to accomplish its goals “by keeping the public 
in ignorance.”31 Yet the Court’s extension of First Amendment protection 
to commercial speech32 was not without limits. The Court was careful to 
emphasize that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never 
been protected,” and that the First Amendment “does not prohibit the State 
from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as 
well as freely.”33 It did not hold that commercial speech was “wholly 
undifferentiable from other forms,” but instead suggested that the differences 
between commercial and noncommercial speech justify a “different degree 
of protection.”34 Since deciding that landmark case, the Court has clarified 
that commercial speech receives a lesser degree of protection than noncom-
mercial speech.35  
Although the First Amendment protects both the right to speak freely 
and the right not to speak,36 the Supreme Court has applied a more lenient 
standard of review to commercial disclosure requirements than to commer-
cial speech restrictions. The Court first articulated its test for commercial 
speech restrictions when it invalidated New York City’s prohibition on 
electric utility advertisements in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission.37 Under Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny, a 
law restricting nonmisleading commercial speech regarding a lawful 
activity is constitutional only if it (1) is in furtherance of a substantial 
government interest; (2) directly and materially advances that interest; and (3) 
is not excessive.38  
 
30 Id. at 765. 
31 Id. at 770. 
32 Commercial speech is defined as speech that “does ‘no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.’” Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
33 Id. at 771-72. 
34 Id. at 771-72 n.24. 
35 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) 
(noting that the Constitution “accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression”). But see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664-68 
(2011) (blurring the distinction between commercial and core First Amendment speech, but 
ultimately applying Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to invalidate Vermont’s restriction on 
the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records for purposes of prescription drug promotion).  
36 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943)). 
37 447 U.S. at 564, 571. 
38 Id. at 564. 
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Five years later, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,39 the Court 
declined to extend Central Hudson. In Zauderer, the Court reviewed an Ohio 
rule of professional conduct that required attorneys who advertised 
contingency-fee services to disclose whether fees were calculated before or 
after deduction of court expenses.40 Instead of applying Central Hudson 
intermediate scrutiny, the Court applied rational basis review to uphold the 
disclosure requirement. 41  The Court began its analysis by noting the 
“material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions 
on speech”: Ohio had not prevented attorneys from conveying information 
to the public, but instead had merely “required them to provide somewhat 
more information than they might otherwise be inclined to present.”42 
Next, the Court contrasted the required disclosure with an attempt to 
“prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion,” and pointed to the First Amendment interest in 
preserving the informational value commercial speech provides to consumers 
to conclude that a commercial speaker’s “constitutionally protected interest 
in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is 
minimal.”43 Finally, the Court noted its consistent position that “disclosure 
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests than 
do flat prohibitions on speech,” and held that “an advertiser’s rights are 
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”44 
Despite the widespread use of commercial speech disclosure requirements 
as a regulatory tool, the Supreme Court has had few opportunities to 
address when these requirements violate the First Amendment.45 Zauderer 
made clear that a “purely factual” disclosure requirement aimed at dispelling 
consumer deception should receive rational basis review protection but did 
not say whether government-mandated disclaimers supporting other state 
interests could as well.46 Although the Court addressed the constitutionality 
of another disclosure requirement in 2010, the challenged law “share[d] the 
 
39 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
40 Id. at 633. 
41 See id. at 650-51 (requiring only that the disclosure requirement be “reasonably related” to 
the relevant government interest). 
42 Id. at 650. 
43 Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44 Id. 
45 See generally Borgner v. Fla. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080, 1082 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (“Our decisions have not presumptively endorsed government-scripted 
disclaimers or sufficiently clarified the nature and the quality of the evidence a State must present 
to show that the challenged legislation directly advances the government interest asserted.”).  
46 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
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essential features” of the ethics rule at issue in Zauderer (they were both 
purely factual disclosure requirements aimed at preventing consumer 
deception), and thus the Court upheld the law without expounding on the 
limits of Zauderer rational basis review.47 The Court’s silence left a circuit 
split on the issue of whether Zauderer extends to government interests 
other than the interest in preventing consumer deception,48 although that 
split was arguably resolved by the 2014 D.C. Circuit decision in American 
Meat Institute.49 
II. AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE CORRECTLY OVERRULED R.J. 
REYNOLDS BY ADOPTING A BROAD READING OF ZAUDERER 
Commercial speech receives First Amendment protection for the infor-
mational value it provides to consumers, but this protection exists in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s statements that a commercial speaker’s 
protected interest in not providing factual information is “minimal.”50 
Given this backdrop, American Meat Institute correctly extended Zauderer 
beyond mandates correcting deception.51 Not only would limiting Zauderer 
to mandates curing consumer deception have cemented a circuit split, it also 
would have created administrative complexity in situations where government 
 
47 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339-40 (2010). 
48 Compare N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(accepting a broader reading of Zauderer wherein it applies beyond consumer deception), and 
Pharm. Case Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have found no 
cases limiting Zauderer [to potentially deceptive advertising].”), with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. 
FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[B]y its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited to 
cases in which disclosure requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of consumers.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. 
v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
49 A petition for Supreme Court certiorari was recently denied in an unrelated case that raises 
the same issue as American Meat Institute (whether Zauderer is limited to government mandates 
requiring commercial speakers to disclose purely factual and uncontroversial information to 
prevent deception). See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC v. 
Jerry Beeman & Pharmacy Servs., Inc., No. 14-0062 (U.S. July 17, 2014); Docket, No. 14-0062, 
Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC v. Jerry Beeman & Pharmacy Servs., Inc., available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/14-62.htm (last updated Nov. 
10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7ZTE-BYST (denying certiorari on November 10, 2014). The 
petitioner argued that “[t]he Fourth Circuit has also applied heightened scrutiny to laws compelling 
speech by companies for purposes other than preventing consumer deception,” and that the Ninth 
Circuit has held that “the First Amendment is inapplicable to laws requiring companies to engage 
in factual speech.” Id. at 15, 19.  
50 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
51 See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 20 (extending Zauderer’s applicability “beyond problems 
of deception”). 
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mandates reach both manufacturers who employ potentially deceptive 
marketing practices and those who do not. Furthermore, limiting Zauderer’s 
reach would have unsettled the current regulatory regime, in which 
government-mandated disclosures and warnings serve other important 
government interests but often do not target potential deception. 
A. Doctrinal Support for Expanding Zauderer to Government Interests Other 
than the Interest in Preventing Consumer Deception 
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment commercial speech jurispru-
dence supports the American Meat Institute decision to extend Zauderer 
beyond mandates correcting deception.  
As an initial matter, R.J. Reynolds and American Meat Institute disagreed 
about the extent to which the Supreme Court had ever addressed “whether 
the principles articulated in Zauderer apply more broadly to factual and 
uncontroversial disclosures required to serve . . . government interests 
[other than preventing consumer deception].”52 Whereas American Meat 
Institute read Zauderer as “not giv[ing] a clear answer,” 53  R.J. Reynolds 
asserted that “by its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited to cases in 
which disclosure requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest 
in preventing deception of consumers.’”54 Likewise, while American Meat 
Institute recognized ambiguity in the Court’s later application of Zauderer,55 
R.J. Reynolds cited Supreme Court precedent it believed “establish[ed] that a 
disclosure requirement is only appropriate if the government shows that, 
absent a warning, there is a self-evident—or at least ‘potentially real’—
danger that an advertisement will mislead consumers.”56 
R.J. Reynolds was correct when it stated that the Supreme Court has nev-
er extended Zauderer to disclosure requirements other than those correcting 
misleading commercial speech,57 but the opinion mischaracterized the cases 
it cited as actually addressing the issue.58 The only clear statement R.J. 
 
52 Id. at 21. 
53 Id. 
54 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Zauderer, 
471 U.S. at 651), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
55 See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22 (noting that Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. Unit-
ed States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010), could be interpreted as “simply descriptive of the circumstances 
to which the Court applied” Zauderer, or, alternatively, as “preclud[ing] any application beyond 
those circumstances”). 
56 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof ’l Regulation, 
512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)). 
57 Id. at 1213. 
58 See id. at 1213-14 (citing Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340; Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 136, 146; and Zauderer, 
471 U.S. at 651-52). 
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Reynolds provided for limiting the scope of Zauderer came from a dissenting 
opinion, not binding precedent.59 No Justice speaking for the Court has 
ever made such a declaration. Indeed, the Court has never had an oppor-
tunity to do so. It has never faced a purely factual speech mandate that 
serves a government interest other than preventing consumer deception.  
United States v. United Foods,60 which R.J. Reynolds cited as an example of 
the Court’s unwillingness to extend Zauderer beyond curing consumer 
deception,61 hardly makes a statement on the issue.62 The compelled speech 
at issue in that case (an assessment charged on each mushroom produced or 
imported to support advertisements promoting generic mushrooms) was 
indisputably nonfactual.63 And, unlike R.J. Reynolds, United Foods contained 
no assertions about Zauderer’s limits. The brief paragraph addressing 
Zauderer merely distinguished United Foods in response to the argument that 
the Court’s conclusions were inconsistent with its precedent.64 At best, United 
Foods can be read as supporting the Court’s unwillingness to extend Zauderer 
to mandates that share none of the characteristics of the mandated disclosure 
upheld in Zauderer (i.e., mandates involving compelled speech that is neither 
“purely factual” nor necessary to “prevent[] deception of consumers”).65 
R.J. Reynolds’s next citation, to Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission,66 when viewed in context, actually provides support for expanding 
Zauderer beyond curing consumer deception. The passage the court cited 
(“[n]othing in Zauderer . . . suggests that the State is equally free to require 
[entities] to carry the messages of third parties, where the messages themselves 
are biased against or are expressly contrary to the [entity’s] views”)67 merely 
stands for the proposition that nonfactual, opinion-based compelled messages 
 
59 See id. at 1213 (“Zauderer ‘carries no authority for a mandate unrelated to the interest in 
avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial messages.’” (quoting Glickman v. Wileman Bros. 
& Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting))). 
60 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
61 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213. 
62 See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We 
think [the appellant] reads too much into United Foods. The paragraph on which [the appellant] 
relies simply distinguishes Zauderer . . . ; it does not provide that all other disclosure requirements 
are subject to heightened scrutiny.”). 
63 See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411 (“The message [of the mandatory subsidies for mushroom 
advertisements] is that mushrooms are worth consuming whether or not they are branded.”).  
64 Id. at 416; see also N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 133 (asserting that United Foods “does 
not provide that all other disclosure requirements [that are not necessary to prevent consumer 
deception] are subject to heightened scrutiny”). 
65 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
66 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
67 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213-14 (quoting Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16 n.12). 
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do not receive rational basis review. The preceding sentence of Pacific Gas, 
which R.J. Reynolds omitted, had suggested a broad government power to 
require factual disclosures from commercial speakers: “The State, of course, 
has substantial leeway in determining appropriate information disclosure 
requirements for business corporations.”68 
R.J. Reynolds also overstated the significance of the final two Supreme 
Court cases it cited. Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business & Professional 
Regulation69 does not so much “suggest[] that Zauderer should be construed 
to apply only when the government affirmatively demonstrates that an 
advertisement threatens to deceive consumers”;70 rather, it simply affirms 
that the government cannot rely exclusively on bare allegations of consumer 
deception to justify a speech restriction. The action by the Florida Board of 
Accountancy at issue in Ibanez (punishing an attorney for advertising her 
Certified Financial Planner (CFP) designation)71 is a speech restriction, not 
a disclosure requirement, thus rational basis review was never an option.72 
Moreover, the Florida Board’s only justification for its actions was that the 
attorney’s speech was “inherently mislead[ing]” or “potentially misleading.”73 
Ibanez certainly makes a statement about the level of evidence required to 
show actual or potential deception sufficient to justify a commercial speech 
restriction,74 but it says nothing about other government interests. 
The final case cited by R.J. Reynolds, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. 
United States, addressed a disclosure requirement that “share[d] the essential 
features of the rule at issue in Zauderer,”75 and thus took no position on 
expanding Zauderer,76 as noted in Part I.77 
R.J. Reynolds and American Meat Institute also differed in the degree to 
which Zauderer’s rationale influenced their interpretations of Zauderer. R.J. 
Reynolds failed to reconcile its analysis with Zauderer’s declaration that a 
 
68 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 15-16 n.12 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). 
69 512 U.S. 136 (1994). 
70 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1214. 
71 Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 138-39. 
72 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
73 Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 144, 146. 
74 See id. at 145. 
75 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339-40 (2010). 
76 But see id. at 1343-44 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(questioning the different treatment of commercial speech restrictions and mandates, expressing a 
willingness to “reexamine Zauderer and its progeny in an appropriate case,” and arguing that 
compelled speech is constitutional only where the targeted advertisement is “inherently likely to 
deceive” (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (emphasis added))). 
77 See supra note 47 and accompanying text; cf. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 22 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (noting Milavetz’s susceptibility to multiple interpretations regarding 
the scope of Zauderer). 
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commercial speaker’s “protected interest in not providing any particular 
factual information in his advertising is minimal.”78 American Meat Institute, 
on the other hand, pointed to Zauderer’s core reasoning to support a broader 
application of rational basis review. First, the court noted that Zauderer 
rejected the Central Hudson test because of the “material differences between 
disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.”79 Next, the 
court pointed to Zauderer’s description of “the First Amendment interests 
implicated by disclosure requirements” as “substantially weaker than those 
at stake when speech is actually suppressed.”80 The court quoted from 
Zauderer once more81 before concluding that “Zauderer’s characterization of 
the speaker’s interest in opposing forced disclosure of [purely factual and 
uncontroversial] information as ‘minimal’ seems inherently applicable 
beyond the problem of deception, as other circuits have found.”82  
While Judge Brown’s dissent in American Meat Institute accused the 
majority of “hing[ing] its claims on just three scraps from Zauderer,”83 a 
complete examination of Zauderer and its historical context does not support 
Judge Brown’s conclusion that “the state’s option to require a curative 
disclosure cannot be disconnected from its right to entirely prohibit deceptive, 
fraudulent, or misleading commercial speech.”84 When the Supreme Court 
extended formal constitutional protection to commercial speech, the Court 
did note that untruthful speech remained unprotected, but the bulk of the 
Court’s analysis (and its primary justification) was the informational value 
of commercial speech to consumers85—a justification in line with the 
language American Meat Institute cited from Zauderer. Further, the Zauderer 
language the majority cited is hardly “three scraps.” On the contrary, it is a 
fair representation of the Court’s analysis of Ohio’s disclosure requirement.86 
 
78 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); cf. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213-15 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing Zauderer without 
mentioning this statement), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (en banc). 
79 Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650). 
80 Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652 n.14). 
81 See id. (“Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is 
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, appellant’s 
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his 
advertising is minimal.” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted))). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 38 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 39-40. 
85 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
86 See generally Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650-53; see also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
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Although neither American Meat Institute nor R.J. Reynolds showed how 
their respective readings of Zauderer would promote First Amendment goals, 
the Second Circuit did in the 2001 case of National Electrical Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. Sorrell.87 To support its expanded reading of Zauderer, the Second 
Circuit pointed to “the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient 
exchange of information [and] protecting individual liberty,” reasoning that 
“mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information . . . 
furthers, rather than hinders,” these values. 88  Requiring disclosure of 
truthful information adds to the “marketplace of ideas” without infringing 
on individual liberty, the court explained. 89  Whereas state-mandated 
personal or political speech impairs individual liberty, requiring commercial 
speakers to disclose accurate factual information “presents little risk that the 
state is forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable state-sanctioned positions, 
suppressing dissent, confounding the speaker’s attempts to participate in 
self-governance, or interfering with an individual’s right to define and 
express his or her own personality.”90 The court recognized that compelled 
disclosures could invoke privacy and property concerns but reasoned that 
rational basis review was still appropriate: courts afford less weight to privacy 
concerns in the commercial setting, and the common law of property and other 
constitutional rights adequately protect commercial speakers’ “legally cognizable 
interest in withholding accurate, factual information.”91 
Expanding Zauderer’s reach to cases involving government interests besides 
curing consumer deception is consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent, 
notwithstanding the success of recent First Amendment challenges to commer-
cial speech restrictions. Some may find it troubling that, in an era when the 
Supreme Court has given increasing deference to commercial speech, both 
the D.C. Circuit (in American Meat Institute) and the Second Circuit (in 
National Electrical Manufacturers Ass’n) failed to identify a Supreme Court 
decision other than Zauderer—which is now nearly 30 years old—to support 
extending the protection of rational basis review beyond preventing 
 
87 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). In National Electrical Manufacturers Ass’n, the Second Circuit 
extended Zauderer to a commercial speech mandate designed to “protect[] human health and the 
environment from mercury poisoning.” Id. at 115. The Vermont statute at issue required manufac-
turers of mercury-containing light bulbs to use packaging labels to inform buyers about the light 
bulbs’ mercury content and about the need to recycle or dispose of the light bulbs as hazardous 
waste. Id. at 107 & n.1. 
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deception.92 While the Court has been more protective of commercial 
speech in recent years, this trend has merely responded to speech restrictions—
without handicapping regulators’ ability to require disclosures. In Milavetz—the 
only purely factual disclosure requirement to come before the Court in the 
three decades since Zauderer—the Court applied Zauderer’s lenient standard 
of review, implying that Zauderer’s core reasoning still holds strong.93 
Moreover, the Court has justified its heightened skepticism of commercial 
speech restrictions with reference to the informational value that commercial 
speech provides to consumers: “The First Amendment directs us to be 
especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for 
what the government perceives to be their own good.”94 This reasoning is 
consistent with Zauderer and supports a more lenient review of all factual 
disclosure requirements, which seek to apprise people of important 
information—not keep them in the dark. 
Neither the D.C. Circuit’s nor the Second Circuit’s opinion seems, however, 
to fully appreciate how crucial a broad reading of Zauderer is to the current 
regulatory regime, particularly for protecting government-mandated speech 
aimed at promoting public health.95 The following Section explores the 
impact that R.J. Reynolds’s narrow reading of Zauderer would have had on 
public health disclosure requirements, including those for which there is 
widespread public support. 
B. The Undesirable Policy Implications of Limiting Zauderer Rational Basis 
Review to Mandates Curing Deception 
The current regulatory regime was predicated on the logic of Zauderer: 
that a commercial speaker’s right not to disclose factual information is 
“minimal,” not fundamental,96 and that regulatory bodies can therefore chip 
away at serious public health problems through purely factual disclosures 
and warnings. These regulatory tools are meant to be a less burdensome 
 
92 See generally Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 20-27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); Nat’l 
Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 113-16. 
93 See supra notes 47, 75-77 and accompanying text. 
94 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (plurality opinion)).  
95 Cf. Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the 
First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 565 (2012) (asserting that failing to extend Zauderer 
rational basis review could have drastic policy implications for the use of disclosure requirements 
as a regulatory strategy). 
96 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
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alternative to legislation that would intrude more on individual liberty.97 
(Note that these regulatory tools typically still receive the protection of 
rational basis review, unless they implicate a fundamental right.)98 If the 
Supreme Court ever adopts the R.J. Reynolds approach, however, legislators 
and regulators might have to abandon disclosures and warnings in favor of 
more onerous, intrusive, and paternalistic measures to promote public health. 
Because many government speech mandates target both commercial 
speakers employing deceptive practices and commercial speakers who do 
not,99 under R.J. Reynolds’s restrictive reading of Zauderer, the same commercial 
speech regulation could be reviewed using different levels of scrutiny 
depending on the challenger or the context.100 Not only would R.J. Reynolds’s 
regime create increased complexity for courts and regulators, but it could 
 
97 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 ( Jan. 21, 2011) (noting that the regula-
tory system should use the “least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends”). 
98 See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 
495 F.3d 695, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (applying rational basis review to FDA’s policy 
limiting access to investigational drugs, a policy intended to protect patients from potentially 
unsafe drugs, because there is no fundamental right to experimental drugs). 
99 Nutrition labeling laws are one example of mandates that sometimes target deceptive prac-
tices, but more often serve other important purposes. For over two decades the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) has required food packaging for “food intended for human 
consumption . . . and offered for sale” to contain a label listing the product’s caloric content and 
other key nutritional information. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-535, § 2(a), 104 Stat. 2353, 2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (2012)) 
(amending the FDCA and requiring nutrition labeling requirements). In 2010, the FDCA labeling 
requirements were extended to cover chain retail food establishments, which must now display 
calorie information for standard menu items. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, § 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119, 573-76 (2010) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2012)) 
(amending the FDCA by requiring restaurants and similar retail food establishments that are “part 
of a chain with 20 or more locations” to “disclose in a clear and conspicuous manner . . . the 
number of calories contained in [a] standard menu item”).  
To be sure, certain food industry practices arguably create the potential for consumer decep-
tion. See generally BD. OF HEALTH, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, 
NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION TO REPEAL AND REENACT § 81.50 OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY HEALTH CODE 5-7 (2008) (“The systematic underestimation of calories suggests 
that consumers have distorted perceptions of calorie content and de facto have been misled to view 
oversized, high-calorie portions as ‘normal’ portions, containing acceptable numbers of calories.”). 
The 2010 federal menu labeling law, however, stretches beyond curing potential deception. It 
applies to chain restaurants regardless of whether their advertisements might mislead consumers 
and regardless of whether their food is considered “unhealthy.” It covers any “restaurant or 
similar retail food establishment” that is “part of a chain with 20 or more locations,” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 343(q)(5)(H)(i)—a class of food establishments that includes the salad chain Sweetgreen, as well 
as traditional “fast food” restaurants. 
100 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing 
the Central Hudson test, which is used to review government-mandated restrictions on noncom-
mercial speech, as “significantly more stringent than Zauderer’s standard”), overruled in part by Am. 
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
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also (partially) invalidate many government-mandated disclosures and 
warnings, especially those with the ambitious goal of promoting public health.  
 R.J. Reynolds’s limited application of Zauderer would be particularly 
troubling for public health regulators seeking to use disclosures or warnings 
for purposes other than preventing deception, because it declares that the 
regulators must first gather mountains of evidence.101 Given the severity of 
many public health problems and health’s paramount importance in our 
daily lives, public health law is an area where regulatory bodies cannot 
afford to wait for airtight evidence before they act. A regulatory agency 
tasked with disease prevention and health promotion does not serve its 
purpose by delaying action until it can accumulate the level of evidence that 
R.J. Reynolds interprets Central Hudson to require.102 Moreover, the com-
plexity of public health problems makes confounding factors nearly inevitable 
in any proposed intervention and makes it difficult if not impossible to 
provide the evidence that R.J. Reynolds requires. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Zauderer, “[a]s a general matter, gov-
ernments are entitled to attack problems piecemeal, save where their 
policies implicate rights so fundamental that strict scrutiny must be applied. 
The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information 
regarding his services is not such a fundamental right.”103 Given the myriad 
factors that influence health and wellness, public health is an area where it is 
especially necessary to have the flexibility to take a piecemeal approach. 
Indeed, legislatures frequently choose to attack complex public health 
problems through multiple channels.104 
While a simple disclosure requirement may not directly and materially 
advance an ambitious public health goal such as reducing obesity, evidence 
that it might directly improve the health of some individuals105 should be 
enough to justify a mandate that poses a “minimal” burden to a commercial 
 
101 See id. at 1221 (“Central Hudson requires FDA to find and present data supporting its 
claims prior to imposing a burden on commercial speech.”). 
102 R.J. Reynolds’s misapplication of Central Hudson is discussed at length later in this Note. 
See infra subsection III.C.2. 
103 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652 n.14 (1985) (citation omitted). 
104 See generally, e.g., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., IMPACT OF MENU LABELING 
ON CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: A 2008–2012 UPDATE 8 (2013), available at http://www.rwjf.org/
content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2013/rwjf406357, archived at http://perma.cc/HKB9-2HYN (“Menu 
labeling is only one of many interventions to reduce energy intake and should be viewed in the 
context of a broader set of strategies.”). 
105 See, e.g., id. at 3, 5 (explaining that menu labeling “may have a greater effect on women 
than men, on higher-calorie items, and among certain types of restaurant chains”). 
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speaker’s First Amendment rights106 and empowers consumers to make 
healthier choices without dictating how they should live their lives.107 This 
approach should be further supported because many alternatives (e.g., 
directly limiting the types of foods or portion sizes restaurants can serve) 
would greatly intrude on individual liberty yet still receive rational basis 
review—because the freedom to consume whatever food one wants is not a 
fundamental right. Yet R.J. Reynolds’s approach would have the interest 
balancing come out the other way, favoring the commercial speaker over 
public health whenever the government’s interest is something other than 
preventing deception.  
Granted, intuition alone should not be enough to support a disclosure 
requirement, but the proper guarantor of good regulation is the Administrative 
Procedure Act, not the First Amendment. American Meat Institute recog-
nized the limited role that First Amendment rights should play in challenges 
to required disclosures of purely factual and uncontroversial information 
about commercial speakers’ products.108 But despite how American Meat 
Institute extends Zauderer beyond disclosure requirements that seek to 
prevent consumer deception, R.J. Reynolds still looms as a formidable 
obstacle to the viability of graphic cigarette warnings as a successful 
anti-tobacco regulatory tool. The next Part explores R.J. Reynolds’s reasoning 
used to invalidate FDA’s nine graphic cigarette warnings, and it provides 
recommendations for how FDA could propose graphic warnings that 
would overcome a future First Amendment challenge while still reducing 
tobacco consumption. 
III. A GRAPHIC CIGARETTE WARNING THAT COULD SURVIVE  
A FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 
Although the D.C. Circuit has now partially overruled R.J. Reynolds and 
extended Zauderer beyond mandates curing consumer deception, R.J. 
Reynolds still poses a difficult—if arguably surmountable—obstacle to 
graphic cigarette warnings as an anti-smoking regulatory tool. While 
challenging, it is possible to create a future graphic warning that would 
receive rational basis review protection. Moreover, a future court’s conclu-
sion that Central Hudson, not Zauderer, provides the correct level of scrutiny 
would not be fatal to the graphic warnings: R.J. Reynolds arguably 
misapplied Central Hudson, and scientific research conducted post–R.J. 
 
106 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
107 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
108 See Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (discussing the 
“minimal” First Amendment rights at issue). 
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Reynolds provides additional support for graphic warnings’ effectiveness in 
reducing tobacco consumption. 
A. Background: The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,  
R.J. Reynolds, and American Meat Institute 
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco 
Control Act) grants FDA the authority to regulate the manufacture and sale 
of tobacco products. 109  The Tobacco Control Act makes it illegal to 
“manufacture, package, sell, offer to sell, distribute, or import” cigarettes 
without one of nine graphic warnings on the cigarette labels.110 The required 
graphic warnings contain two components: a textual warning and an 
associated graphic image. The Act lists the nine potential textual warnings111 
and directs FDA to “issue regulations that require color graphics depicting 
the negative health consequences of smoking to accompany the [textual 
warning] statements.”112 The graphic warnings are meant to be noticed: they 
must “comprise the top 50 percent of the front and rear panels” of cigarette 
packages113 and must “comprise at least 20 percent of the area” of each 
cigarette advertisement.114 In its final rulemaking (the one at issue in R.J. 
Reynolds), FDA selected nine graphic images, as required by the Tobacco 
Control Act.115 But FDA then went one step further and required each 
graphic warning to list the “1-800-QUIT-NOW” tobacco cessation hotline, 
a measure which it believed was “appropriate for the protection of the 
public health” in accordance with its authority under § 906(d) of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).116 
 
109 Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 101(b), § 901, 123 Stat. 1776, 1786-87 (2009) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 387a (2012)). 
110 Id. sec. 201, § 4(a)(1), (d), 123 Stat. at 1842-43, 1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), (d) (2012)). 
111 Id. sec. 201, § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat. at 1842-43 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)). 
112 Id. sec. 201, § 4(a)(d), 123 Stat. at 1845 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)). 
113 Id. sec. 201, § 4(a)(2), 123 Stat. at 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)). 
114 Id. sec. 201, § 4(b)(2), 123 Stat. at 1843 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)). 
115 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,674, 36,753-54 ( June 22, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1141.10, 1141.12). 
116 Id. at 36,680-81, 36,754-55 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1141.16); see also Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, sec. 101(b), § 906(d), 123 Stat. at 1796-97 (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 387f(d) (2012)) (adding section 906(d) to the FDCA so that “[t]he Secretary [of Health 
& Human Services] may by regulation require restrictions on the sale and distribution of a 
tobacco product . . . if the Secretary determines that such regulation would be appropriate for the 
protection of the public health”). 
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Although FDA’s rulemaking cited research findings from other countries 
that had implemented similar graphic warning requirements,117 when tobacco 
manufacturers brought a First Amendment suit against the rulemaking in 
the D.C. Circuit, the R.J. Reynolds court concluded that FDA had presented 
insufficient evidence of the warnings’ effectiveness to pass Central Hudson 
intermediate scrutiny review.118 The court thus held that the nine graphic 
warnings violated tobacco manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.119  
The R.J. Reynolds court gave two reasons for applying Central Hudson 
instead of Zauderer. First, the court pointed to the Tobacco Control Act’s ban 
on certain advertisement practices and to “the absence of any congressional 
findings on the misleading nature of cigarette packaging itself ” to conclude 
that cigarette advertisements are not potentially misleading. 120  Second, 
according to the court, the graphic warnings were not purely factual: “many 
of the images chosen by FDA could be misinterpreted by consumers” who 
might think they suggest typical outcomes of smoking, and the images were 
“primarily intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at most, shock the 
viewer into retaining the information in the text warning.”121 After its 
defeat in the D.C. Circuit, FDA withdrew its nine graphic warnings and 
announced its intent to submit revised graphic cigarette warnings.122 
Two years later in American Meat Institute, the D.C. Circuit readdressed 
Zauderer’s scope after a meat industry trade association brought a First 
Amendment challenge to a USDA regulation requiring meat products to 
carry labels indicating the country where the animal was born, raised, and 
slaughtered.123 The court, sitting en banc, held “that Zauderer in fact does 
reach beyond problems of deception,” and overruled R.J. Reynolds to the 
extent that it could be read as limiting Zauderer to disclosure requirements 
aimed at correcting deception.124 Next, the court applied Zauderer, starting 
with an assessment of the adequacy of the interest motivating the 
country-of-origin disclosure requirement.125 The court acknowledged that 
Zauderer “gives little indication of what type of interest might suffice” and 
noted that the Supreme Court has not clarified whether Zauderer would 
 
117 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1209-10 & 1209 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 
overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
118 Id. at 1217-21; see also infra subsection III.C.1 (discussing how the evidence from other 
countries was weakened by confounding factors). 
119 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222. 
120 Id. at 1214-15. 
121 Id. at 1216. 
122 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
123 Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
124 Id. at 20-23. 
125 Id. at 23. 
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allow government reliance on interests that do not qualify as “substantial” 
under Central Hudson.126 Ultimately, the court did not decide whether a 
lesser interest would suffice, because it determined that the interest supporting 
the country-of-origin labeling requirement was indeed “substantial.”127 
After its analysis of the relationship between the government’s disclosure 
requirement and stated interest, the D.C. Circuit went on to explain that 
the factors triggering Zauderer were “either unchallenged or substantially 
unchallenged.”128 The required disclosures were clearly factual, and as such 
they were “directly informative of intrinsic characteristics of the product 
[the American Meat Institute members are] selling.”129 Further, the disclosure 
was not “controversial”: (1) although the word “slaughter” “might convey a 
certain innuendo,” the regulation allowed retailers to use the unobjectionable 
term “harvested” instead; and (2) the labeling did not communicate “a 
message that is controversial for some reason other than dispute about 
simple factual accuracy”—such as a message “so one-sided or incomplete” 
that it is not “factual and uncontroversial.”130 Nor did the requirement force 
“corporations to carry the messages of third parties, where the messages 
themselves are biased against or are expressly contrary to the corporation’s 
views.”131 Finally, the disclosure was not “so burdensome that it essentially 
operates as a restriction on constitutionally protected speech.”132 Accordingly, 
the D.C. Circuit upheld the USDA country-of-origin disclosure requirements.133 
B. Could a Future Graphic Cigarette Warning Receive  
Rational Basis Review Protection? 
Now that the D.C. Circuit has extended Zauderer beyond mandates curing 
deception, FDA’s asserted interest in the graphic cigarette warnings 
(reducing smoking rates) will undoubtedly qualify as an interest adequate to 
trigger application of the Zauderer standard. Although American Meat 
Institute did not decide whether a less-than-“substantial” government 
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 23-26. 
128 Id. at 27. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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interest would suffice, even R.J. Reynolds conceded that reducing smoking 
rates was a substantial government interest.134 
R.J. Reynolds, however, appeared to make a strong statement against 
finding any graphic cigarette warning “purely factual and uncontroversial,” 
and there is little in American Meat Institute to temper this analysis.135 The 
R.J. Reynolds court concluded that FDA’s original nine graphic warnings 
were not purely factual: “many of the images chosen by FDA could be 
misinterpreted by consumers” who might think they suggest typical outcomes 
of smoking, and the images were primarily “intended to evoke an emotional 
response, or, at most, shock the viewer into retaining the information in the 
text warning.”136  
FDA might overcome this significant obstacle (the nonfactual nature of 
its required warnings) with a two-step strategy: select unenhanced images 
that clearly and directly depict the associated textual warnings without the 
need for consumer extrapolation, and then persuade the reviewing court to 
view R.J. Reynolds’s logic as heavily influenced by the particular graphic 
images before the R.J. Reynolds court at the time. 
To rebut the D.C. Circuit’s worry about potential misinterpretation, 
FDA could presumably present evidence that consumers do not actually 
interpret images like “a man smoking through a tracheotomy hole”137 as 
typical outcomes of smoking. In this manner, FDA could overcome the 
argument that its selected images are easily misinterpreted and thus nonfac-
tual.138 Better yet, FDA could select images that do not “require[] significant 
extrapolation on the part of the consumers”139—i.e., images that directly 
 
134 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part 
by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485 (1995) (recognizing the government’s substantial interest in 
“promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens”). 
135 See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. The D.C. Circuit soon will have the 
opportunity to clarify the meaning of “purely factual and uncontroversial information.” In the 
recent case of National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, the court granted SEC’s petition for panel 
rehearing and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing multiple questions left 
unresolved by Zauderer and American Meat Institute. Order Granting Petition for Panel Rehearing, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-0635 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2014). One such question is the 
meaning of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” as used in Zauderer and American 
Meat Institute. Id. 
136 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216. 
137 Id. 
138 While FDA could add disclaimers (e.g., “smoking through a tracheotomy hole is not a 
common consequence of smoking”), these disclaimers would defeat the entire purpose of the 
warnings: the warnings are meant to correct people’s underestimation of the risk smoking poses to 
them personally. See id. at 1228 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (noting that “many smokers underestimate 
their personal risks” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
139 Id. at 1216 (majority opinion). 
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depict the accompanying textual warnings. Because such images are less 
prone to misinterpretation, a court will more likely accept them as “purely 
factual” and therefore worthy of Zauderer rational basis review. 140 
Further, consumers with lower levels of education are more likely to 
remember health messages that include graphics directly correlating with 
accompanying text.141 
The larger obstacle, however, will be rebutting R.J. Reynolds’s concern 
about FDA’s “tacit admission” that the graphic warnings are “primarily 
intended to evoke an emotional response” or “shock the viewer into retaining 
the information in the text warning.” 142  R.J. Reynolds drew this “tacit 
admission” from two assertions in FDA’s brief: (1) research shows “pictures 
are easier to remember than words” and (2) “emotional responses, such as 
worry and disgust, reliably predict the likelihood that consumers will 
understand and appreciate the substance of the warnings.”143  
A court should not, however, interpret the D.C. Circuit’s language as 
holding that all images are inherently beyond Zauderer’s scope. FDA’s 
graphic images may be “a much different animal” than the mandates at issue 
in Zauderer and Milavetz,144 but “Zauderer itself eviscerates the argument 
that a picture or drawing cannot be accurate and factual.”145 As the Sixth 
Circuit explained in its analysis upholding the constitutionality of the 
Tobacco Control Act in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 
the Zauderer Court rejected the argument that illustrations by attorneys 
create “unacceptable risks that the public will be misled, manipulated, or 
confused,” and noted the important communicative functions of pictures: 
they attract the attention of the audience and impart information directly.146 
If the Supreme Court in Zauderer pointed to pictures’ informative function 
as a reason to grant First Amendment protection to images in commercial 
 
140 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (endorsing 
rational basis review of government-mandated disclosures involving “purely factual and uncontro-
versial information”). 
141 See generally Julie C. LaVille, Note, A Warning Worth a Thousand Words: First Amendment 
Challenges to the FDA’s Graphic Warning Label Requirements, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 243, 262 (2013) 
(explaining how textual warnings “require a college reading level” and graphic warnings would 
facilitate comprehension by individuals across educational levels (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
142 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216. 
143 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
144 Id. 
145 Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 560 (6th Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied sub nom Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). 
146 Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985)). 
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speech, then the use of graphics in cigarette warnings to impart health risk 
information effectively should not bar rational basis review protection. 
As for the R.J. Reynolds court’s contention that images evoking negative 
emotional responses are nonfactual, FDA can make a good case that a future 
court should abandon this reasoning. As the R.J. Reynolds dissent astutely 
noted, the R.J. Reynolds argument “leads to the counterintuitive conclusion 
that the more concerning the negative health effects of a particular product, 
the more constrained the government is in mandating disclosures of those 
facts.”147 The reasoning of Discount Tobacco is equally persuasive:  
Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, spark 
controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not magically turn 
such facts into opinions. . . . [W]hether a disclosure is scrutinized under 
Zauderer turns on whether the disclosure conveys factual information or an 
opinion, not on whether the disclosure emotionally affects its audience or 
incites controversy.148 
Further, this reasoning is consistent with American Meat Institute’s inquiry 
into whether the required country-of-origin labels were “biased against or . . . 
expressly contrary to the corporation’s views” (because only an affirmative 
answer would merit heightened scrutiny) and with its characterization of 
“slaughter” as “a plain, blunt word for a plain, blunt action” (providing an 
accurate statement of fact, and thus meriting rational basis review).149 
If a future court is unwilling to abandon R.J. Reynolds’s reasoning alto-
gether, FDA can still argue that the court’s strong statements were specific 
to the particular images before it, and it may be able to escape R.J Reynolds 
by selecting images that convey health warning information without 
reference to their associated textual warnings.  
The R.J. Reynolds court was particularly bothered by three of FDA’s 
selected images: the crying woman, the small child surrounded by a cloud 
of smoke, and the man wearing a t-shirt bearing the words “I QUIT.”150 
 
147 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
148 Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569. 
149 Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1986) (plurality opinion)). The court, 
however, did acknowledge that “slaughter” “might convey a certain innuendo,” but because the 
rule allowed retailers to use the term “harvested” instead, the court found “no claim” that the 
disclosure requirement was “controversial in that sense.” Id. 
150 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216-17 (majority opinion). These images accompanied the following 
textual statements: (1) “WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers” 
(crying woman); (2) “WARNING: TOBACCO SMOKE CAN HARM YOUR CHILDREN” 
(small child); and (3) “WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your 
health” (man with “I QUIT” t-shirt). See John D. Kraemer & Sabeeh A. Baig, Analysis of Legal and 
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According to the court, these “inflammatory images” do not convey any 
warning information, “cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to 
convey information to consumers,” and are “unabashed attempts to evoke 
emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting.”151  
Figure 1: FDA’s Proposed Graphic Warnings152 
 
FDA certainly should abandon the image of the man with the “I QUIT” 
t-shirt because it does not “depict[] the negative health consequences of 
smoking” as required by the Tobacco Control Act.153 And although the 
images of the crying woman and small child arguably communicate the 
negative consequences of smoking when the graphic warnings are consid-
ered together with their associated textual statements, the link between the 
images and the textual statements is attenuated. It takes an inferential leap 
to understand that the woman is crying because either she or a loved one 
has fatal lung disease, and it takes a similar inferential leap to understand 
 
Scientific Issues in Court Challenges to Graphic Tobacco Warnings, 45 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 334, 
335 fig.1 (2013); see also infra Figure 1 (reproducing the complete set of nine graphic warnings 
proposed by FDA before R.J. Reynolds). 
151 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216-17. 
152 Kraemer & Baig, supra note 150, at 335 fig.1. 
153 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, sec. 201, § 4(d), 
123 Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012)). 
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that the small child might be harmed by the smoke in the image. When 
viewed in isolation, these images do not convey warning information and 
therefore suffer from a substantial flaw, given that FDA’s rulemaking noted 
the importance of using images to effectively communicate information to 
people with poor English or literacy skills.154  
FDA should choose unenhanced images that clearly, directly, and 
independently depict the health warning information conveyed in the 
warning’s textual statement. These warnings should, in the words of 
American Meat Institute, be “directly informative of intrinsic characteristics of 
the product.”155 In this manner, FDA may be able to rebut both reasons the R.J. 
Reynolds court provided for concluding that the graphic cigarette warnings were 
nonfactual and did not merit Zauderer rational basis review (potential 
consumer misinterpretation, and undue focus on an emotional response).156 
C. Satisfying Central Hudson 
Even if FDA selects images that clearly, directly, and independently 
depict the negative health consequences of smoking, a court following R.J. 
Reynolds might still conclude that the warnings are beyond Zauderer’s scope. 
This conclusion need not be a fatal blow to the revised graphic warnings, 
however, because R.J. Reynolds misapplied Central Hudson’s intermediate 
scrutiny test. Also, there are good arguments for applying a more relaxed 
version of Central Hudson to graphic warnings aimed at reducing the 
number one cause of preventable death in the United States. Finally, recent 
 
154 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,709 ( June 22, 2011). 
155 Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
156 The R.J. Reynolds majority dedicated surprisingly little space to assessing the requirement 
that cigarette labels include the “1-800-QUIT-NOW” number. It simply said that the number 
“hardly sounds like an unbiased source of information,” given the lack of accompanying explana-
tion about the services provided on the hotline. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216.  
The dissent, however, dedicated considerably more space to the constitutionality of the hotline 
number but nonetheless concluded that it could not pass Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny. Id. 
at 1236-37 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Judge Rogers reasoned that, although the hotline number’s 
inclusion on the package directly served the substantial government interest in “assist[ing] 
smokers in their cessation efforts,” less speech-restrictive means of achieving this goal existed and 
were inadequately addressed by FDA. Id.  
Given that the Tobacco Control Act does not actually require inclusion of the hotline number, 
see supra note 116 and accompanying text, FDA should seriously consider how this additional 
requirement might influence a court’s overall inquiry into the factual, unbiased, nonideological 
nature of the entire graphic warning. Similarly, FDA should consider whether equally effective 
but less speech-restrictive means exist to increase consumer awareness of cessation resources. See, 
e.g., id. at 1236 (suggesting a package insert as an alternative). 
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research efforts provide promising scientific evidence of graphic warnings’ 
ability to reduce tobacco consumption. 
1. The Lack of Evidence Presented in R.J. Reynolds 
R.J. Reynolds found FDA’s evidence supporting its claim that there was 
an “‘international consensus’ surrounding the effectiveness of large graphic 
warnings” to be woefully inadequate.157 The D.C. Circuit noted that the 
Australian and Canadian studies FDA cited showed only that graphic 
warnings caused people to think about quitting smoking or to attempt to 
quit; the studies did not “show that the implementation of large graphic 
warnings has actually led to a reduction in smoking rates.”158  
When FDA did present evidence from countries that introduced graphic 
cigarette warnings and saw an actual reduction in smoking rates, R.J. 
Reynolds discounted FDA’s evidence by pointing to confounding factors. 
The D.C. Circuit characterized the causal link between Canada’s graphic 
warning requirement and decreased smoking rates in the years following 
their implementation as “mere speculation and conjecture” because the 
Canadian government also implemented other smoking control initiatives 
(e.g., increased cigarette taxes and further restrictions on public smoking) 
during this period.159 FDA did not help matters by conceding in its pro-
posed rulemaking that it could not directly attribute any decrease in the 
Canadian smoking rate to graphic warnings.160 
Finally, the R.J. Reynolds court pointed to the Regulatory Impact Analysis 
accompanying FDA’s final regulation, which estimated that graphic warnings 
would reduce U.S. smoking rates by a mere 0.088%.161 To the court, this 
paltry statistic was yet another factor showing FDA’s failure “to present any 
data” proving the regulation would directly advance its goal.162 But the 
court failed to mention FDA’s reference to a Canadian study of young 
smokers, where 22.6% of males and 26.6% of females reported that graphic 
cigarette warnings caused them not to have a cigarette in the past month.163 
While restricting is not the same as quitting, evidence that an individual 
 
157 Id. at 1219 (majority opinion). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995)). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1220 (citing Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 36,628, 36,721 ( June 22, 2011)). 
162 Id. at 1220-22. 
163 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 
69,532 (proposed Nov. 12, 2010). 
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reduced his cigarette consumption would certainly seem relevant to FDA’s 
goal to reduce tobacco consumption.164 Nonetheless, the R.J. Reynolds court 
concluded that FDA failed to present requisite evidence to show the graphic 
warnings directly advanced FDA’s government interest.165 The court thus 
did not reach the third prong of Central Hudson, which asks whether the 
speech regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest.166 
2. R.J. Reynolds Demanded Too Much 
Although R.J. Reynolds correctly questioned the sufficiency of FDA’s 
evidence, the court applied a stricter standard than necessary under the 
“directly advance” prong of Central Hudson.167 The court quoted several 
Supreme Court cases to establish that FDA had to do more than provide 
“only ineffective or remote support” for its methods and that FDA could 
not “satisfy its burden by mere speculation or conjecture.”168  
The D.C. Circuit did not, however, use any case law to clarify exactly 
what level of evidence was actually necessary to satisfy Central Hudson.169 
Instead, the court misapplied the APA’s “substantial evidence” standard to 
its First Amendment analysis.170 In doing so, the court failed to appreciate 
the considerable distance between “mere speculation or conjecture” and the 
unattainable standard it set: the requirement of airtight evidence that a 
 
164 See generally Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 
sec. 101(b), § 906(d), 123 Stat. 1776, 1796-97 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d) (2012)) 
(granting FDA discretion to promulgate regulations to protect the public health, with special 
consideration given to whether the regulations will result in “increased . . . likelihood that existing 
users of tobacco will stop using such products”). 
165 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1222. 
166 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1980) 
(requiring speech restrictions to be “narrowly drawn” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
167 See id. at 566 (“[W]e must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted.”). 
168 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218-19 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 
487 (1995), and Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)). 
169 Id. at 1217-21. 
170 The court noted that the APA requires it to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence,” and it then 
grafted the APA’s “substantial evidence” requirement on to Central Hudson’s “directly advance” 
prong. Id. at 1218 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012)); id. at 1219-22.  
As an initial matter, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), the APA’s “substantial evidence” test, is a separate 
challenge to an agency’s formal rulemaking or adjudication. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 321 (6th ed. 2014). It has nothing to do with a First 
Amendment challenge. Moreover, the APA’s “substantial evidence test accords considerable 
deference to agency findings of fact.” Id. at 322. 
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graphic warning by itself will “directly cause[] a material decrease in 
smoking rates.”171 
Central Hudson has been criticized for being “difficult to apply in a 
consistent and predictable manner,” and courts disagree about the level of 
protection that it affords commercial speech.172 Compounding the uncer-
tainty, the Court has used Central Hudson almost exclusively for commercial 
speech restrictions, but its recent Central Hudson analysis in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health (a 2011 case involving a commercial speech restriction for pharmaceutical 
companies that was intended to promote public health) muddied the water 
by blurring the line between commercial and core First Amendment 
speech.173 The Supreme Court cases most directly on point exemplify the 
Court’s inconsistent application of Central Hudson: Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly struck down Massachusetts regulations prohibiting any smokeless 
tobacco or cigar advertising within one thousand feet of schools or playgrounds, 
despite the Massachusetts Attorney General’s “ample documentation of the 
problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars.”174 In contrast, 
the plurality opinion of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island invalidated 
Rhode Island’s ban on advertising the price of alcoholic beverages but was 
far less accepting of evidence produced by the state.175 
Although Lorillard ultimately held that Massachusetts’s tobacco advertising 
ban violated tobacco manufacturers’ First Amendment rights, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the state had produced sufficient evidence showing 
the restriction directly advanced its goal of preventing underage tobacco 
use.176 Massachusetts supported its position with evidence linking tobacco 
advertising practices to underage tobacco use.177 It pointed to studies and 
 
171 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (emphasis omitted). 
172 Keighley, supra note 95, at 565 & n.129 (citing Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s 
Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 630-31 (1990), and Robert Post, The Constitutional 
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 42 (2000)). 
173 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664-68 (2011). The Court’s analysis in 
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center (another case about a commercial speech restriction for 
pharmaceutical companies intended to promote public health) was far more faithful to Central 
Hudson, but it was no more instructive on the “directly advance” prong of Central Hudson. See 535 
U.S. 357, 370-77 (2002). The Court struck down the law’s prohibition on advertising compounded 
drugs because the speech restriction was more extensive than necessary, even while assuming it 
might indeed directly advance the government’s interests. Id. at 371. 
174 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001). 
175 517 U.S. 484, 505-08 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
176 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 556-561. The advertising restriction failed the final prong of Central 
Hudson because Massachusetts did not show its restriction was no more extensive than necessary. 
Id. at 561-66. 
177 Id. at 557-60. 
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Supreme Court precedent supporting the theory that advertising stimulates 
demand, while suppressing advertisements may have the opposite effect.178 
Massachusetts also pointed to FDA findings that an overwhelming majority 
of Americans start using tobacco products prior to adulthood and that 
advertising plays a crucial role in these decisions.179 In addition, Massachusetts’s 
evidence included reports by the Surgeon General and Institute of Medicine 
finding “sufficient evidence to conclude that advertising and labeling play a 
significant and important contributory role in a young person’s decision to 
use cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products.” 180  The state also cited 
evidence documenting smokeless tobacco sales, advertising techniques 
targeting youth, an attendant increase in younger smokeless tobacco users, 
and the link between advertising and demand for cigars.181 Notably, Lorillard 
did not require Massachusetts to provide any evidence showing that 
restrictions on tobacco advertisements actually prevented underage tobacco 
use.182 Rather, all the state had to show was that tobacco advertisements 
were partially responsible for the youth tobacco use problem.183 
The 44 Liquormart plurality opinion, on the other hand, demanded 
considerably more from Rhode Island to support its ban on advertising the 
price of alcoholic beverages. In a portion of the opinion joined only by 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, Justice Stevens concluded that the 
price advertising ban failed Central Hudson because the state provided no 
evidentiary support whatsoever to show its ban would significantly advance 
its interest in reducing alcohol consumption.184 Although Rhode Island 
presented evidence that the price advertising ban might have “some impact 
on the purchasing patterns of temperate drinkers of modest means,” Justice 
Stevens found this evidence insufficient.185 The state, he noted, had “presented 
no evidence to suggest that its speech prohibition w[ould] significantly 
 
178 Id. at 557. 
179 Id. at 557-58. 
180 Id. at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted). The data showed that (1) children smoke 
fewer cigarette brands than adults, and tend to choose more heavily advertised brands; (2) the 
majority of children recognize Joe Camel, and after his introduction, Camel’s share of the youth 
market rose from 4% to 13%; and (3) trends in tobacco consumption in a certain population 
correlate with the introduction and marketing of products to that population. Id. at 558-59. 
181 Id. at 559-61. 
182 See id. at 556-61. 
183 See id. at 561 (finding that Massachusetts’s evidence was sufficient because the Court was 
“unable to conclude that the Attorney General’s decision to regulate advertising of smokeless 
tobacco and cigars . . . was based on mere speculation and conjecture” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
184 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
185 Id. at 506. 
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reduce marketwide consumption.” 186  Justice Stevens seemed to require 
evidence showing that the ban would reduce alcohol consumption among all 
groups; he emphasized “the evidence suggest[ed] that the abusive drinker 
will probably not be deterred by a marginal price increase, and that the true 
alcoholic may simply reduce his purchases of other necessities.”187 
A court evaluating the inevitable First Amendment challenge to FDA’s 
revised graphic cigarette warnings should look to the Court’s analysis in 
Lorillard for guidance rather than to the comparable analysis in 44 Liquormart. 
In 44 Liquormart, the link between Rhode Island’s speech restriction and its 
goal of reducing alcohol consumption was attenuated. The success of Rhode 
Island’s speech ban hinged on assumptions about the economic deci-
sionmaking process and behavior of two distinct groups: alcohol manufacturers 
and consumers. Rhode Island’s price advertising ban was intended to 
prevent alcohol manufacturers from competing on the basis of price—which 
in theory would keep alcohol prices higher, thereby reducing demand (and 
consumption) across all alcohol consumer groups. 188  The logic behind 
FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings is more direct: as in Lorillard, the regula-
tions involve presumptions about how information (about the health risks 
or pleasures of tobacco products) influences consumers’ decision to smoke. 
According to FDA, given the ample evidence that smokers (especially 
adolescents) smoke in part because they underestimate the personal health 
risks of smoking, closing the information gap with graphic warnings will 
motivate and empower smokers to quit, thereby decreasing tobacco 
consumption.189 The link between the regulation and the intended effect 
involves just one intermediary (consumers), instead of two (manufacturers 
and consumers). 44 Liquormart’s analysis should not apply to graphic 
cigarette warnings. 
Further, even if FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings failed to materially 
decrease tobacco consumption, the means through which FDA hoped to 
achieve this goal (informing consumers of the health risks of smoking) 




188 Id. at 505. 
189 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part 
by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
190 This statement does not mean to contend that promoting consumer knowledge of smoking 
risks alone is enough to satisfy Central Hudson, a position adopted (and overstated) by the R.J. 
Reynolds dissent. See id. at 1235-36 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“The government’s informational 
interest in effectively conveying the negative health consequences of smoking clearly qualifies as 
‘substantial’ under the second prong of Central Hudson.”). Judge Rogers cited Edenfield v. Fane for 
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restriction in 44 Liquormart did not. While FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings 
are designed to curb smoking by giving consumers more information, 
Rhode Island’s alcohol price advertising ban sought to achieve its goal by 
keeping consumers in the dark. The Court in 44 Liquormart emphasized 
several times that it was important to apply a demanding review because 
Rhode Island was restricting accurate commercial information.191 Even if a 
court applies Central Hudson because it determines that the graphic cigarette 
warnings are not the “purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosures to 
which Zauderer applies, the warnings still promote—rather than block—the 
flow of factual information. 192 A commercial speaker—whose speech is 
protected in the first place because of the information it provides to 
consumers193—is more burdened by a speech restriction than by a mandate to 
disclose accurate (albeit emotionally evocative) information about its product.194 
Most importantly, smoking, the public health problem both Lorillard 
and FDA’s graphic cigarette warnings seek to attack, is the number one 
 
the proposition that “there is no question that [the government’s] interest in ensuring the accuracy 
of commercial information in the marketplace is substantial.” Id. at 1235 (quoting Edenfield v. 
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993)). But Edenfield recognized a substantial state interest in ensuring 
the accuracy of commercial information already in the marketplace, not in injecting additional 
accurate information into the marketplace—especially where there is insufficient evidence that the 
existing information is inaccurate. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768-69. Moreover, if a court applying 
Central Hudson has already determined that the mandate is not “purely factual and accurate,” using 
an “information interest” to satisfy Central Hudson—a considerably easier task than showing the 
mandate reduces smoking rates—appears to be an end-run around First Amendment requirements. 
191 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499, 501 (explaining that “the State retains less regulatory 
authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at the substance of the information 
communicated” and “complete speech bans . . . are particularly dangerous because they foreclose 
alternative means of disseminating certain information” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
192 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1229 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“The tobacco companies do not 
challenge the factual accuracy of the textual statements included in the warning labels.”). 
193 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
194 Tobacco manufacturers argued that the message of the graphic warnings was “ideological 
and not informational” because the images “shame and repulse smokers and denigrate smoking as 
an antisocial act.” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1211 (majority opinion). While FDA’s warnings do 
contain disturbing images that accurately depict the gruesome consequences of smoking, see supra 
Figure 1, the images do not make the warnings any more “ideological” than the textual warnings 
tobacco manufacturers accepted as accurate; the images simply make the warnings more likely to 
be noticed and remembered. Although it can be argued that FDA’s graphic warnings use cigarette 
packages to promote “the government’s anti-smoking message,” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212, the 
same can be said of the textual warnings that have been on cigarettes for the past five decades. See 
supra note 4 and accompanying text. And it is beside the point that the graphic images undermine 
the manufacturers’ “own economic interest,” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212: the disclosure 
requirement approved in Zauderer, which lessened the appeal of attorneys’ contingency-fee rates, 
did as well. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 633, 650-63 (1985) 
(upholding a state rule requiring the attorneys’ contingent-fee advertisements to disclose “whether 
percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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preventable cause of death in the United States.195 It kills approximately 
443,000 Americans each year.196 The Supreme Court has stated that smoking 
poses “perhaps the single most significant threat to public health in the 
United States.” 197  Smoking is a serious public health problem because 
nicotine is highly addictive198 and because, for decades, cigarette manufacturers 
lured smokers in at a young age before they could fully appreciate the 
health consequences of this highly addictive habit.199 Substantial evidence 
exists showing a persistent information gap, particularly among adolescents.200 
People underestimate the personal health risks of smoking, fail to appreciate 
the highly addictive nature of cigarettes, and remain ignorant about the 
harmful effects of secondhand smoke on others.201 
Because smoking is a public health problem of such great magnitude and 
importance, involves a highly addictive product, and carries with it great 
harms that consumers still fail to fully appreciate, courts should apply a 
relaxed version of Central Hudson when evaluating a graphic warning that 
accurately depicts smoking’s health consequences. The government should 
not have to prove that a disclosure requirement alone would significantly 
reduce marketwide tobacco consumption. It certainly should not be required 
to provide evidence that the graphic warning will significantly reduce 
tobacco consumption among those with greatest dependency on this highly 
addictive product, as 44 Liquormart suggests.202 To demand proof before 
implementation that a graphic cigarette warning significantly reduces 
 
195 See Kraemer & Baig, supra note 150, at 334 (warning that smoking causes more U.S. deaths 
per year “than any other modifiable risk factor”). 
196 Id. 
197 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000). 
198 See OFFICE OF SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
DHHS PUB. NO. (CDC) 88-8406, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE 
ADDICTION 149 (1988) (“Basic observations and experimental research indicate that cigarette 
smoking is not a random or capricious behavior that simply occurs at the will of those who smoke. 
Rather, smoking is the result of behavioral and pharmacologic factors that lead to highly 
controlled or compulsive use of cigarettes.”). 
199 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (Aug. 28, 1996) (“Most people 
who suffer the adverse health consequences of using cigarettes and smokeless tobacco begin their 
use before they reach the age of 18, an age when they are not prepared for, or equipped to, make a 
decision that, for many, will have lifelong consequences.”). 
200 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers, 
J., dissenting) (“[A]dolescents in particular fail to appreciate the highly addictive nature of 
cigarettes.”), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
201 Id. 
202 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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smoking rates203 is not only unfeasible but also contrary to the government’s 
interest in promoting public health.204 
Instead, it should be sufficient for FDA to provide evidence that the 
graphic warnings are likely to encourage a significant number of smokers to 
reduce their cigarette consumption. If FDA can provide evidence that 
smokers who are better informed of smoking’s health risks and have an 
increased desire to quit205 are more likely to successfully quit (or reduce 
their cigarette consumption), then FDA’s graphic warnings should be able 
to pass judicial scrutiny. FDA should thus be able to satisfy any First 
Amendment burdens with rigorous scientific studies showing that the 
graphic warnings increase consumers’ knowledge of the health consequences 
of smoking and strengthen their desire to quit. This information could be 
supplemented with data from other countries showing a decrease in smoking 
rates after the implementation of similar graphic warning labels (even if 
other anti-smoking initiatives were advanced at the same time).206  
Even if graphic cigarette warnings might be effective only in conjunction 
with other regulatory efforts to reduce smoking rates, that fact should not 
be an obstacle to satisfying Central Hudson. Given the severity of the 
smoking problem, legislative and regulatory bodies certainly should be 
using additional smoking control initiatives (e.g., increased cigarette taxes 
and further restrictions on public smoking) to reduce tobacco consumption. 
If the courts interpret Central Hudson to demand an evidentiary standard 
that is harder to satisfy when a legislature attacks a problem through multiple 
channels, the resulting regime disadvantages regulators seeking to alleviate 
complex problems. Such a regime poses a particular problem for public health 
law and especially for tobacco control, where a multifaceted approach involving 
multiple public health strategies and regulatory initiatives is often necessary.207  
 
203 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221 (majority opinion) (“Central Hudson requires FDA to 
find and present data supporting its claims prior to imposing a burden on commercial speech.”). 
204 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d) (2012) (emphasizing FDA’s discretion to promulgate 
regulations as “appropriate for the protection of the public health”). 
205 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (discussing FDA’s existing evidence showing that graphic 
warnings increase smokers’ thoughts of quitting and attempts to quit). 
206 Contra id. (dismissing FDA’s argument that the Canadian smoking rate decreased after 
graphic warnings were introduced in Canada, “because the Canadian government implemented 
other smoking control initiatives” concurrently). 
207 See generally Corinne G. Husten & Lawrence R. Deyton, Understanding the Tobacco Control 
Act: Efforts by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to Make Tobacco Morbidity and Mortality Part of 
the USA’s Past, Not Its Future, 381 LANCET 1570, 1578 (2013) (“It is only with the full implementa-
tion of both traditional public health strategies and new regulatory authorities that we will ensure 
that tobacco-related morbidity and mortality is part of the USA’s past, not its future.”). 
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More specifically, as long as FDA can provide evidence that graphic 
warnings close the information gap and that consumers equipped with 
better information are more likely to reduce or eliminate their tobacco 
consumption, FDA should be able to rely on the evidence of the association 
between Canada’s implementation of a graphic warning requirement and 
decreased Canadian smoking rates in the following years.208 Given the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Lorillard, this level of evidence surely 
satisfies the government’s burden of providing more than “mere speculation 
or conjecture.”209 
Further, the Supreme Court has appeared to be principally concerned 
about speech restrictions at odds with other regulations (i.e., an inconsistent 
and irrational regulatory regime that cuts against the state’s asserted 
interest), rather than about informative disclosure requirements that work 
in conjunction with other regulations to achieve the state’s important and 
ambitious goal (e.g., future FDA-mandated graphic cigarette warnings). 
This rationale undergirds Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., where the Supreme 
Court sustained an alcohol manufacturer’s First Amendment challenge to 
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (FAAA).210 The Court took issue 
with the FAAA regulations because the statute prohibited disclosure of 
alcohol content on product labels unless disclosure was required by state 
law—but FAAA regulations prohibited these disclosures only if affirmatively 
prohibited by state law.211 This “overall irrationality”—not the government’s 
claim that the FAAA reduced pressure to market beer on the basis of alcohol 
content, thereby lowering beer alcohol levels—was FAAA’s fatal flaw.212 
When it comes to factual disclosure requirements, courts should 
move away from the standard set by R.J. Reynolds, where more complex 
problems and more ambitious government goals make it harder for a 
government-mandated disclosure requirement to pass constitutional muster. 
As shown in this subsection, a court may stray from R.J. Reynolds’s overly 
strict application of Central Hudson without breaking from Supreme Court 
precedent. Although the evidence before R.J. Reynolds would not have been 
 
208 See R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (“In 2001, the year the warnings were introduced, the 
[Canadian] smoking rate dropped [from 24 percent] to 22 percent, and it further dropped to 21 
percent in 2002.”). 
209 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 
(1995)); see also supra notes 174, 176-183 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
more lenient evidentiary standard in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)). 
210 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 478. 
211 Id. at 488. 
212 Id. 
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enough to satisfy the standard advocated here, researchers continue to build 
a strong scientific body of evidence showing that graphic cigarette warnings 
are likely to reduce tobacco consumption. 
3. New Evidence 
In the wake of the R.J. Reynolds decision, FDA and the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) created fourteen Tobacco Centers of Regulatory Science.213 
Billed as “first-of-kind,” these regulatory centers are designed to “generate 
research to inform the regulation of tobacco products to protect public 
health”214 and to “ensure that U.S. tobacco regulatory actions and activities 
are based on sound and relevant scientific evidence”215—a mission that 
heeds R.J. Reynolds’s warning. NIH’s Tobacco Centers Research Portfolio 
page reveals promising studies that could provide the necessary proof of 
graphic warnings’ effectiveness. 216  One study will expose participating 
smokers to different warning labels (graphic versus standard text) and 
monitor their smoking behavior and cigarette risk beliefs over fifty days.217 
Another looks at whether ingredient labels on cigarette packages “alter 
cessation behavior,” and at which labels “most effectively increase adult 
smokers’ cessation behaviors (quitting, attempting to quit, or smoking fewer 
cigarettes),” especially among minority populations.218 Still another will 
focus on adolescents and young adults, identifying how pro- and anti-tobacco 
media and warning labels “influence perceptions of risks, benefits, acceptability, 
and subsequent tobacco use.”219 R.J. Reynolds criticized FDA for its heavy 
reliance on evidence that graphic warnings increased smokers’ desire to 
 
213 FDA and NIH Create First-of-Kind Tobacco Centers of Regulatory Science, NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH (Sept. 19, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/sep2013/od-19.htm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/SVC4-ZN3M. 
214 Id. 
215 Centers Research Portfolio, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://prevention.nih.gov/tobacco-
regulatory-science-program/research-portfolio/centers (last updated Mar. 26, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/QH4Q-ZJLS. 
216 See id. (listing studies investigating topics such as “Informing and Correcting Perceptions 
Regarding Tobacco Products in Young Adults” and “Communicating the Risks of Harmful 
Cigarette Smoke Constituents”). 
217 Andrew A. Strasser, Abstract: Tobacco Product Messaging in a Complex Communication 
Environment, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://prevention.nih.gov/docs/trsp/rfa-da-13-003/
webinar/strasser.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y5PY-XGHM. 
218 Noel T. Brewer, Abstract: Effective Communication on Tobacco Product Risk and FDA Author-
ity, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://prevention.nih.gov/docs/trsp/rfa-da-13-003/webinar/
brewer.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4LJJ-KQAF. 
219 Pamela Ling, Abstract: Improved Models to Inform Tobacco Product Regulation, NAT’L INSTS. 
OF HEALTH, https://prevention.nih.gov/docs/trsp/rfa-da-13-003/webinar/ling.pdf (last visited Dec. 
16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LD4K-F5RQ. 
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quit,220 but a future court may find this evidence persuasive if supplemented 
with evidence showing a strong link between behavioral intent and action. 
Additionally, in the two years since the D.C. Circuit invalidated FDA’s 
graphic warnings, new scientific evidence has already emerged showing that 
graphic cigarette warnings “prevent smoking initiation and promote 
cessation.” 221  According to a recent Canadian study, graphic warnings 
reduced smoking odds by approximately twelve percent and quit attempts 
by a third.222 Another Canadian study found that “people for whom warning 
labels were more noticeable and salient were more likely to have quit or 
reduced smoking.” 223  These research trends are promising and instill 
confidence that, by the time FDA issues its revised graphic cigarette 
warnings, the government will have amassed the scientific evidence necessary 
to overcome another First Amendment challenge.224 
CONCLUSION 
R.J. Reynolds narrowed the scope of Zauderer rational basis review 
protection, while ratcheting up Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to 
closely resemble strict scrutiny, thereby threatening the viability of public 
health disclosures and warnings by demanding an unattainable level of 
certainty and precision. In American Meat Institute, the D.C. Circuit seized 
the opportunity to preserve the current regulatory state and avoid adminis-
trative complexity by overruling R.J. Reynolds and extending Zauderer 
rational basis review to mandates beyond those curing deception. Despite 
this victory for regulators, FDA still faces a formidable challenge in select-
ing revised graphic cigarette warnings. FDA can overcome the obstacle R.J. 
Reynolds presents by selecting unenhanced images that clearly, directly, and 
independently convey the health risk information described in the accompa-
nying textual warning, by arguing that R.J. Reynolds misapplied Central 
 
220 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part 
by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
221 Kraemer & Baig, supra note 150, at 338. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 The final prong of Central Hudson—whether the speech regulation is “excessive”—was not 
addressed by R.J. Reynolds, but it should not pose a barrier for graphic cigarette warnings. See 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (“[I]f the 
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, 
the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”). As the R.J. Reynolds dissent noted, “[t]he failures of 
previous government efforts to convey the relevant information through small, textual warnings 
on the side of cigarette packages” shows that graphic images are no more extensive than necessary. 
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
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